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Brandom and the Second Person 
 
Abstract 
Brandom is one of the main advocators of the idea that meaning is instituted 
within basic linguistic practices through mutual exchanges.  The aim of this paper is to 
show that such framework cannot do the required job if the dynamics of mutual 
exchanges is understood in interpretational terms. After arguing that the interpretational  
framework does not work,  the paper presents an alternative second-personal 
conversational model capable of meeting the challenge. 
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Brandom and the Second Person 
 
Against a communitarian-consensual perspective that reduces meaning to what 
the relevant community as a whole thinks is correct, Brandom, following Davidson
1
, 
has complained that in order to develop such an elucidation of linguistic practices, the 
relation between language users and meaning must be approached starting with the 
point of view of an interpreter, that is, that it is not only necessary to take into account 
the relation between human practices and semantic interpretants but also that we cannot 
make sense of this idea without acknowledging the perspectival character of meaning-
attribution within those practices. This is what Brandom calls the I-Thou relation, 
claimed to be more fundamental than the I-We relationship that constitutes the 
communitarian-consensual construal of social linguistic practices
2
. It is only through the 
eyes of the interpreter that we can make sense of language as a game or practice in 
which human beings are engaged. The I-We relation can only be understood as deriving 
from the I-Thou one and characteristic of the latter is that it is an interpretative stance 
that can be thought of as equivalent to an external, observational standpoint:  
 
 “[…]this sort of external interpretive stance —what one must do, how one must 
treat an alien community in order thereby to count as taking them to be making assertions 
and inferences—is seen to be equivalent to an internal scorekeeping stance within a 
discursive community.  That is, one must adopt toward the practitioners […] the same 
sort of attitude one both takes them to adopt towards each other and adopts towards one’s 
                                                 
1
 Brandom 2010: 33-34, where he acknowledges this debt. 
2
 See Brandom 1994: 37-42, especially p.39 
 
 
3
own discursive fellows. […] In short, the stance in question is a translational-interpretive 
stance that evidently belongs in a box with the orthodox Davidsonian variety”
3
 
 
In this manner, Brandom rejects the idea that there is a distinction between being 
in conversation (an internal scorekeeping stance within a discursive community) and an 
external interpretational stance (the one someone undertakes when observing a 
conversation from a distance). Nevertheless, I will argue that collapsing both 
dimensions commits this theory to ignore the relevance of a different understanding of 
second personal interaction, one that may seem to be essential for making sense of the 
possibility of linguistic practices altogether. 
  Different authors have underlined the need of a second-personal dimension in 
Brandom’s account of normative linguistic practices
4
. Habermas (2000) has claimed 
against Brandom’s picture that if we think of the interpreter stance in a third-personal 
way, we lose the idea of a language as being a way in which individuals engage in the 
pursuit of common goals and values. Brandom responds that according to a third-
personal point of view of meaning attribution like his, one can actually engage in social 
linguistic practices without pursuing common goals or sharing values
5
. According to 
Brandom, a second-personal kind of interaction among language users is needed only to 
make sense of common goals shared by them, but not to make sense of the possibility of 
there being linguistic practices altogether.  
On the other hand, Kukla & Lance (2009) and Wanderer (2010) have argued that  
being addressed is an essential dimension of speech acts in the game of giving and 
asking for reasons. According to Kukla & Lance (2009: 163) this addressive, second-
                                                 
3
 Brandom 2010: 33-4. See also Brandom 1994: 659, n.50. 
4
 Habermas 2000; Kukla & Lance 2009 and Wanderer 2010. 
5
 Brandom 2000a:  362, acknowledges Habermas’ account of his theory as a ‘fair characterization’.   
 
 
4
personal character of speech acts - mostly clear in imperatives, invitations, promises and 
so forth - is characteristic to every speech act, even if implicitly, and necessary for them 
in order to perform their normative function. In Wanderer’s opinion, this is an essential 
feature of certain speech acts – challenges in Brandom’s terms - and absolutely essential 
for those to be such. They all agree in that the addressive second personal aspect can be 
thought to be implicit in Brandom’s theory and that the person targeted will be failing to 
give an appropriate response only if ignores the address, and will be acknowledging it 
no matter how she responds to it (compliance, refusal, or anything in between)
6
. But this 
line of argument does not put into question the essentially interpretational observational 
picture that is the basis of the dynamics of scorekeeping practice, but rather 
complements it.  Contrary to this framework, I will claim that an understanding of the 
practice of giving and asking for reasons as a second-personal interaction is in tension 
with the interpretational understanding of it that Brandom subscribes to. If that picture 
is not abandoned, normative practices cannot be described as second-personal in a full-
blooded sense. While thinking of exchanges among participants in the practice in this 
way is essential for Brandom’s model to work, as I will claim, a second person 
understanding of the practice of giving and asking for reasons is both necessary for his 
framework to work and at the same time in tension with the essential interpretational 
stance that Brandom undertakes in Making it Explicit (MIE)
7
. 
My aim in this paper is to present an argument, distinct from all of the above, 
that purports to show that a framework that understands the institution of meaning 
                                                 
6
 Kukla & Lance 2009: 162. 
7
 Throughout this paper I will be focusing on Brandom’s MIE, which still counts as his systematic 
account of the minimal sufficient conditions for a practice to be linguistic. Since MIE, Brandom has 
worked intensively on Hegel’s notion of recognition, a notion that also plays an important role in this 
paper. The question remains as to whether his later work could be said to be compatible with it. If so, the 
issues raised in this paper still apply to his later work. 
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through an essential interpersonal practical dynamics of exchanges, in order to account 
for meaning and the normative import of content in the individual’s practice, cannot be 
understood as an interpretational observational scorekeeping stance. Accordingly, I will 
argue here that contrary to Brandom’s response to Habermas, a second-personal kind of 
interaction is absolutely necessary to give an account of linguistic practices in terms of 
the interaction of linguistic users. But it is necessary for very different reasons to those 
invoked by Habermas, Lance & Kukla and Wanderer. I will claim that interpersonal 
exchanges must be rather modeled in terms of a second-personal recognitional 
dynamics. This means that some essential and basic features of the minimal conditions 
for a practice to be deploying propositional content need to be rethought through a 
different picture in which the core of the practice is the recognition of the others’ 
assessments towards one moves in the game, one that is only intelligible as a practice 
within a linguistic community,  and not, as in Brandom’s picture, incompatibilities and 
scorekeeping of entitlements and commitments. Without the introduction of such a way 
of understanding linguistic practices, normativity is lost and, with it, the possibility of 
meaning altogether. 
The contrast between a second-personal dynamics in my terms and a third-
personal one can be characterized by the way in which we take into account a different 
person’s perspective. Only in the former case it is implied that the other person’s 
perspective matters to their interlocutor. Becoming sensitive to norms, as will be shown 
in this paper, implies acknowledging the other person’s assessment of our actions. This 
acknowledgment must be understood as involving two dimensions: (1) acknowledging 
the attributions the other person makes to me by taking myself to be committed and (2) 
withdrawing previous commitments in the light of the challenge that this person 
addresses to me. In order for the practice to be normative, it is required to be sensitive in 
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just this way which, as will be argued, requires the interaction of the two perspectives to 
have the form of a conversation, within a discursive community, where the criticisms 
and differences between the two are acknowledged. This is the contrast between a third 
person interpretative standpoint, in which the interpreter could remain completely 
external to the perspective of the interpretee and does not  need to ‘interact’ with her  
except by interpreting, and the kind of practice that involves second person stances 
among practitioners. 
The structure of this article is as follows: in the first section I present the 
conditions of adequacy on semantic normativity raised by Wittgenstein and Sellars and 
the general strategy to meet them designed by Brandom. In the second section, I 
criticize Brandom’s view by giving an example of interaction between two people using 
Brandom’s account of interaction. I show that in a practice like that no norms are in 
place and no meaning has been assigned to linguistic sounds and marks. Thirdly, I 
present a positive account of interaction, a second-personal model, that incorporates a 
set of distinctive elements that characterize conversations and allow us to meet the 
conditions of adequacy presented in the first section. Finally, I make some concluding 
remarks regarding the allegedly essential role of this second-personal sort of interaction 
in basic linguistic practices (hereafter BLP). 
 
1. Brandom’s Answer to the Wittgensteinian Conditions of Adequacy 
 
We can think of a language as “a system of expressions the use of which is 
subject to certain rules” (Sellars 1954: 204). Becoming a language user would then be 
conceived as learning to obey the rules for the use of its expressions. Nevertheless, as 
Sellars remarked, this would immediately imply a vicious regress, for the rules that 
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formulate the correct use of the expressions are themselves expressed in a language, so 
we would need to know a language in order to learn it; the postulation of an open-ended 
sequence of meta-languages that have to be learned is then unavoidable
8
. 
According to Sellars, the strategy for solving this problem is to distinguish 
between the ability to formulate, to say, to state the rules that codify the correct use of 
an expression and the ability to act conforming to norms. The idea is that this last ability 
involves acting in the light of the demands that norms enjoin in actions, i.e. becoming 
able to respect the norm, without presupposing “being aware” or “having before one’s 
mind” the very content that one is acknowledging and respecting in acting that way, on 
pain of restating the aforementioned regress. 
Accordingly, regarding the possibility of giving an account of normativity, two 
conditions of adequacy emerge. On the one hand, accounting for the possibility of 
becoming a rule follower in the sense of being able to perform normative actions 
implies that the subject becomes sensitive to the requirements of a norm in a stronger 
sense that just acting according to a regularity, thus acting in the light of the demands of 
the norms and not coinciding with them ‘by chance’. On the other, accounting for this 
possibility requires rejecting the idea that what one does when following a rule is to 
follow explicit contents that one has in mind. 
To conceive this coming into language through the picture constituted solely by 
an individual coping with her environment will prove equally wrong headed. As 
Wittgenstein remarks in PI, 258: ‘One would like to say: whatever is going to seem 
right to me is right. And that only means that here we can’t talk about “right”’. The 
important point here is that a person cannot become a language user in isolation. The 
problem seems to be that a basic trait of a language, and the main reason why we are 
                                                 
8
 There is another alternative, i.e. to postulate a language of thought that is fundamentally different from 
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talking about rules in the first place, is that using a language is something that can be 
done correctly or incorrectly. We can make mistakes, and learn how to act in the future 
from those mistakes.  But, if the correctness in the use of expressions and the 
acknowledgement of mistakes were completely left to the point of view of the 
individual, then what is correct and what seems correct would coincide. And this would 
mean that there would not be a distinction between right and wrong available to the 
speaker, i.e. no space for the distinction between being right and wrong, and hence we 
would lose the possibility of having meant anything at all. The act of meaning 
something by the use of an expression would turn out to be completely illusory.  
The conclusion that some readers of Wittgenstein draw from this argument is 
that what is needed in order to fulfill the conditions of adequacy aforementioned implies 
a shift from an individual to a social model of meaning (Cfr. PI 202). What this amounts 
to is to think of meaning and normativity from the point of view of socially structured 
linguistic practices. 
This is precisely Brandom’s strategy to account for meaning. According to him, 
to get out of the Wittgenstein-Sellars’ puzzle, semantic norms should be thought of as 
instituted by those who acknowledge them in practice. Only the assessing attitudes 
implicit in the practice of treating performances as correct or incorrect - not thought of 
as propositionally contentful states, but as practical doings- can do the required job. 
This would prevent the regress of interpretations, on the one hand, and avoid a 
regularity account with no normative statuses in place, on the other. Accordingly, when 
we think of normative linguistic practices, what these attitudes institute are linguistic 
norms: semantically contentful norms.  
                                                                                                                                               
learned languages. See Fodor 1975. I won’t discuss the prospects of this move here. 
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Brandom describes what these attitudes or doings should be like in order to be 
sufficient for the practice that involves them to be a normative linguistic practice. In the 
third chapter of MIE, he points out that there are some doings that suffice for a practice 
being a linguistic practice. Inferring and asserting are the basic doings that someone 
engaged in a linguistic practice has to be able to perform, and they are constitutive of 
what Brandom calls the game of giving and asking for reasons. An assertion is 
something that is a reason and something for which we can demand reasons, and hence 
assertions are inferentially articulated. The following points characterize Brandom’s 
understanding of the game of giving and asking for reasons: 
1.Assertions can exhibit two normative statuses: commitments and entitlements. 
2.Making an assertion is in the first instance undertaking a commitment which in 
turn involves further commitments given the inferential articulation among 
commitments. Such are what Brandom calls commitive inferences. 
3. Commitments are not only something that can be given as a reason but also 
something reasons can be asked for.  So, there are permissive inferences that 
articulate entitlement preserving relations among assertions. 
4.The relations between commitments and entitlements must be underwritten by 
incompatibility relations. A participant in the game must recognise incompatiblity 
relations among commitments which can be described in the following way: p is 
incompatible with q if commitment to p precludes entitlement to q. 
5.Relations among commitments are not only intrapersonally inferentially 
articulated but also interpersonally articulated. Other practitioners of the game of 
giving and asking for reasons can use an assertion just made and undertake it.  
Thought of in this way, making an assertion is also putting it forward as a 
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commitment that anyone can undertake hence attributing entitlement to it. This is 
what may be called interpersonal inheritances of commitment. 
6. Vindicating entitlement to one’s claims can be achieved either through 
intrapersonal intercontent justifications or through interpersonal intracontent 
inheritance of commitments and entitlements.  
7.The role that assertions have in a linguistic practice depends on authority, and this 
in turn is only intelligible against the background of the corresponding responsibility 
to vindicate the entitlements to the commitments that the assertion represents. 
Judging is committing oneself, taking responsibility. 
8.The way to ask for justification is to challenge an assertion; that is done in the 
basic case by making incompatible assertions. Characteristic of the game is a default 
challenge structure: giving reasons is only mandatory when they are properly asked 
for
9
. The authority gained in the first place by default and vindicated by fulfilling 
the responsibility of justifying it is central to the game. It is also possible for the 
practitioners to defer their justifying responsibility to another asserter.  
  
To sum up, asserting is undertaking a commitment, making a claim for 
entitlement; in doing so one becomes responsible, undertaking the responsibility to give 
justification, when properly asked for. There are two different ways to show entitlement 
to one’s claims: justifying by asserting, and deferring to another that is entitled to it
10
. 
                                                 
9
 The reason is that taking the asserter to be prima facie entitled is just what is for an interpreter to take 
her as a competent deployer of the concept, that is what one does when one undertakes a commitment that 
has been asserted by another (i.e. interpersonal inheritance of commitment) Cf. Brandom 2010:  26.  
10
 There is in fact a third way to show entitlement, by invoking authority as a reliable non-inferential 
reporter. There are also two sorts of inferences that we did not discuss: practical and empirical. I will not 
discuss any of them here since they are not central to my argument.  
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Thought of in this way the game itself depends on the structure of authority and 
responsibility that links the individual’s doings in a social, intersubjective way, linking 
the intracontent interpersonal and the intercontent intrapersonal dimensions of 
justification. The cost of the failure to answer a challenge is the loss of authority in the 
eyes of the scorekeeper and so, in his eyes, the loss of the authority to pass it on to 
others. On the other hand, while the reassertion license is in place (not yet challenged or 
satisfactorily responded to in the eyes of the scorekeeper) the entitlement can be 
bequeathed to others who can defer justification to the original assertor. According to 
Brandom (2010: 26-7), it is this authority and corresponding responsibility together 
with the notion of challenge what gives its characteristic dynamics to the inferential 
practice.  
At the same time, making an assertion implies the acknowledgment on the part 
of the asserter of the commitment he is overtly undertaking – even if this does not imply 
that she acknowledges all the commitments that she is thereby undertaking. This 
acknowledgement is thought of as a status that is (properly) attributed to someone when 
she overtly asserts a claim and not as any kind of internal or (conscious) act of 
recognition, this acknowledgement is thus thought of exclusively as an attribution on 
the part of the interpreter, the scorekeeper. The crucial social aspect of the activity of 
inferring lies in the way in which each participant of the practice keeps score of the 
other’s entitlements and commitments. Being an interpreter is being a scorekeeper. 
Given this framework, how can we account for the sensitivity to norms that the 
interpreter himself must exhibit in his practices in order for these to be semantically 
normative? The very same question is presented by Brandom by asking what one has to 
be doing in order to be an interpreter, that is, a language user, the participant in a 
normative linguistic practice. His answer is that in order to be a language user one has 
 
 
12
to be interpretable as such, as taking and attributing all those normative attitudes: 
undertaking commitments, attributing entitlements, responding to challenges 
intrapersonallly and interpersonally and taking others to be doing so.  
Brandom, as noted above, argues that the perspectival character of meaning attributions 
has to be thought of as an external, third-personal stance. This perspective is equivalent 
to the one speakers adopt towards each other within a linguistic community. In the 
following section I show this perspective to be insufficient to account for the 
normativity of linguistic practices. Next, I describe what else is needed on the part of 
the practitioners in order for them to be engaged in a normative linguistic practice; this 
will show a contrast between the attitudes that practitioners must adopt towards each 
other when engaged in linguistic exchanges within a linguistic community (what I will 
call a second person perspective) and those involved in interpreting a community from 
an external point of view, i.e. the third-personal interpretational stance. 
 
2. A community of interpreters.  
 
As described above, according to Brandom there are two ways to respond to a 
challenge:  either by justifying intrapersonally the claim challenged or by deferring the 
responsibility to justify it to the original assertor. Moreover, if one fails to fulfill the 
justificatory responsibility demanded by the challenge one loses the authority that was 
originally claimed when issuing the assertion in the first place.  
Nevertheless, an argument will be presented in this section for the idea that a 
third kind of response to a challenge (essentially second-personal) is absolutely 
fundamental in the model in question and that without it the practice would lack the 
appropriate friction and could not be normative. This second-personal kind of response 
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could be basically described as the withdrawal of the original claim: though it needs not 
be an explicit disavowal, it needs to be a change in the assertor’s box and one that is 
sufficiently known by the challenger. In the context of MIE, Brandom refers to a 
response of such a kind and mentions that it would be useful to have in the basic 
linguistic practice special speech acts for queries, disavowals and challenges, but claims 
that such a response does not need to be in place in every possible linguistic practice
11
.  
I will not argue for the idea of any special speech act of disavowal. What I will show is 
that, even if it does not always involve an explicit speech act of disavowal, this third 
kind of response - essentially thought of as a change in the original assertor’s box
12
 – is 
absolutely fundamental to make the model at stake work and, moreover, that its 
inclusion implies shifting from a third-personal understanding of the role of the 
interpreter to a second-personal one. 
The strategy of my argument will be to present a practice with no second-
personal recognition of incompatible claims by withdrawing claims previously held. 
This will show that this practice is not normative for the individuals involved and that 
their claims cannot be thought as contentful. 
 
There are these three possible kinds of responses to a challenge
13
:  
                                                 
11
 Brandom 1994:  192-3. 
12
 Brandom uses the term “box” to refer to the set of commitments, entitlements and incompatibility 
relations that a speaker attributes to herself and to others. 
13
 At this point it is worth noting a crucial difference between Wanderer 2010 argument and mine. He 
argues in favor of the idea that the recognition of challenges must be implicit in MIE. The claim is that 
challenges need to be register per se, independently of the responses - 1, 2, or 3 above- that the assertor 
gives. For him this means that these acts are addressed and that they are recognized as addressed. As it 
will be clear from the argument to follow, this move is insufficient for responding to my challenge. My 
argument is that challenges need to be recognized as such by being fundamentally undertaken as 
authoritative by the assertor in the act of changing her commitments, and that if this were  not the central 
way in which we respond to challenges, the practice would dissolved. 
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1.     By deferring the justification to someone else. 
2.     By an intercontent intrapersonal justification. 
3.   By acknowledging the incompatibility in our own box and thus withdrawing the 
commitment (second personal interaction).
14
 
We will suppose for the sake of the argument, that  
(a) the practice does not involve (3) – since BLP are possible without (3). 
(b) the practitioners do not share any commitments. 
(c)  the practitioners do not have any incompatible claims in their own boxes. 
Both (b) and (c) will be drop later in the argument. 
Given three players P1, P2 and P3: P1 says p (asserts, gets committed and asks 
for entitlement, claims for authority, and assumes responsibility). P2 makes a claim 
incompatible in his view with p: q. P1 may then act in the first (1) or the second (2) 
ways mentioned above. Let us suppose she does (2), an intercontent intrapersonal 
justification. She offers r, which is, in her box, a commitment which entitlement- 
preserves p. Now, P2 would not recognize it as entitlement-preserving in his own box 
since r does not entitlement-preserves p in the light of q since q is incompatible with p 
according to P2’s own box. This is to be expected as different participants in the 
practice attach different contents to the utterances they use to specify each other’s 
commitments. What is shared is the scorekeeping practice but not the contents of the 
claims exchanged. Might the sharing of the practice suffice for P2 to recognize r as 
entitlement-preserving of p even if P2 attaches a different content to r? That is, might 
P2 recognize the pragmatic move that P1 is making, thus that P1 takes p to be justified 
in the light of r? Indeed. P2 will attribute to P1 a commitment to r and a commitment to 
an entitlement preserving inference from r to p, but P2 needs not and would not take this 
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to be a good answer to his challenge since he is committed to q, and r does not 
entitlement-preserve p in the light of q. So in the eyes of P2, P1 loses authority as an 
assertor even if he acknowledges the move that P1 is making from a pragmatic point of 
view.   
Might P1 reply to P2’s challenge in any other way? P1 cannot offer r as a claim 
incompatible with q since in that case ex hypothesi the commitments of P2 would not 
include r or any other incompatible commitments to q. By hypothesis, P1 cannot show 
P2 that he must recognize r as a justification for p through an incompatibility, as it must 
be in order for r to be a justification for p in the light of q, since in order to do that r has 
to be incompatible with q and hence, by hypothesis, would not be in P2’s box. Thus, P2 
has no reasons to recognize p as justified (since she would not have in her own box nor 
r nor any claim from which r would follow). Hence, P1 can only effectively respond to 
P2 by (1), a deferral to P3. 
But exactly the same situation would take place between P3 and P2.  
Having exhausted the possible responses P1 could provide, P1 seems to be 
unable to properly respond to the challenge by showing to P2 what her reasons are or by 
agreeing with P2 that she is not entitled to p. The problem seems to be that in this 
practice the reasons of each practitioner do not count as reasons for the others unless 
they counted as already justified commitments in the box of each one of them. The only 
way in which the practitioners could get others to recognize what they take themselves 
to be entitled to (i.e. the only way in which they could come to share commitments) 
would be by previously having the same claims in their boxes. It is only by removing 
from the setting the assumption that they do not hold incompatible claims in their own 
boxes (c above) that they can come to share a view about what they are entitled to. If 
                                                                                                                                               
14
 This is the second dimension of second personal interaction; cfr. (2), p. 5 above. I will refer to the first 
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that were the case,  P1 may find for example that she was already committed to q by 
holding s and that s is incompatible with p, the claim she asserted.  In this case she 
would agree with P2, the challenger, and withdraw p, but this would occur absolutely 
independently of the interlocutor and her justifications. So this is not a way in which 
P2’s commitments could count as challenges for P1 since it is simply a case in which P1 
was previously holding incompatible claims. What is lost in a scenario like this one is 
the possibility of interlocutors addressing incompatible claims to each other in a way in 
which they can get their interlocutor to recognize their challenges when there was not 
previous reason for the interlocutor to change their commitments. 
  According to Brandom’s model, what this situation amounts to is that in the eyes 
of each scorekeeper the others will lose authority. The only remaining authority would 
then be the one that each individual scorekeeper has on herself. Thus, even if this may 
come as a surprise in a model such as Brandom’s where the social structure of the 
practice is essential, such a practice without second-personal interaction  (i.e. responses 
3 above), would be individual and not social. Each person’s reasons would not be 
inherited intersubjectively, on the contrary, each participant would only have individual 
sources of justification and she would only attribute entitlement to those assertions of 
others that were in her eyes indistinguishable from her own. Furthermore, if the 
practitioners only had individual sources of justification it would be always possible for 
them not to recognize incompatible claims addressed to them by others as criticisms 
since they would not recognize any normative-status-modifying sanctions by others 
unless they had already thought that they were wrong. This means that they would be 
reluctant to accept any challenge raised by others, not willing to change or revise their 
commitments in the light of other practitioners’ reasons.  
                                                                                                                                               
one in the next section. 
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  So, in this individual practice each of the practitioners would lose their grip on 
any criteria of correction (any notion of being wrong), they would simply refuse to 
recognize any authority but their own. To put it in a Wittgensteinian way, in such cases, 
whatever seemed correct to them would be correct; and hence what they were doing 
would not be subject to any norms. This is Wittgenstein’s argument against the 
possibility of a private language, one that Brandom accepts when he claims that a 
practice to be normative has to be social.
15
 In fact, they would lose the possibility of 
recognizing incompatibilities altogether, losing sensitivity to any cognitive friction and 
with it the possibility of having meant anything at all.  
 One may think that this line of reasoning can be contested by stressing the role 
of agreement in the practice, something that plays a key role in Davidson’s account of 
normative linguistic practices
16
. This will amount to removing condition (b) above, i.e. 
that the practitioners do not share any commitments. This would give substance to the 
idea that the interlocutors need to come to realize incompatibilities against a background 
of shared commitments, one that already makes sense of the implicit incompatibilities in 
their own boxes that the other participants could be pointing to when raising a challenge 
(as it is apparent, this will also amount to dropping condition (c) above).  It is true that 
Brandom, as opposed to Davidson
17
, does not include a condition of ‘agreement in 
background beliefs’ among the minimal conditions to make sense of BLP (see MIE, ch. 
3). This is important as he takes the dynamics of scorekeeping and the exchange of 
incompatibilities to be the basis of BLP, being what possibilitates agreement. 
Nevertheless, as Brandom describes his view as “belonging in a box with the orthodox 
Davidsonian variety”, one might think that this sort of agreement is somewhat implicit 
                                                 
15
 This is pervasive in Brandom’s work, see e.g. Brandom 1994:  52-5. 
16
 I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for pressing me on this point. 
17
 Davidson’s account itself is not immune to a similar line of criticism; see my Satne 2014. 
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in the framework. But this will not make any difference to the argument here for the 
content of the claims in each participant’s boxes are still subject to the individual’s 
interpretation. Since the framework does not require of the interlocutors to share the 
interpretation of every claim they exchange, even if there are some utterances they do 
share (say they both have s, j, and t in their own boxes
18
), the differences in how they 
interpret the relations of those to q, r and p, will influence the content of the ones in the 
exchange (and those they “agree upon”) leading them to have different interpretations of 
the content of the claims at issue. Because of this, the claims they agree upon would not 
make any difference as to the dynamics of posing challenges and responding to them, 
thus leaving the situation exactly as it was portrayed at the beginning.  
 A different possible response to this argument is to be found in Brandom and 
Wanderer. According to them
19
, the relevant traits of this sort of second-personal 
interaction might be thought to be already implicit in the interpretationist framework of 
MIE.  The argument will run as follows: since the interpreter needs to be able to 
distinguish between content and attitude for her own commitments, something that is 
then explicitated by the de dicto and de re locutions when those are in place
20
, then a 
practical and implicit way of treating claims as objective conceptual contents is at play 
                                                 
18
 As the game is characterized by a default challenge structure an important number of utterances will be 
shared by the interlocutors, even if they might be interpreting them differently. 
19
 They argue in favor of this idea when they describe the second-personal dynamics of exchange as being 
possibly implicit in MIE framework. See Wanderer 2010 and Brandom 2010: 315. Brandom seems to 
recognize that it is not implicit when he says, in response to Wanderer, that the inclusion of a second-
personal aspect to every assertion “seems (to him) as a promising variant and development of the MIE 
apparatus” (ibid.) 
20
 See Brandom 1994, chapter 8 and Brandom 2000b, chapter 6. It is important to note that this is what 
Brandom understands as meeting the objectivity condition on meaning, i.e. that what is correct is different 
from what one –anyone- takes to be correct. Brandom thinks he shows that his theory meets this condition 
when the interpretational structure of attributing and acknowledging commitments is explicitated in 
attitude locutions. If my argument is right, Brandom cannot meet this condition, see below. 
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in MIE. The very ability of attributing commitments but not acknowledging them in 
practice will be the way in which the model accounts for the individual being sensitive 
to the normativity of contents. This can also be thought as the individual taking an 
interpretative stance towards himself, where two time slices of the same individual will 
fulfill the roles of the challenger and the addressee of the challenge, one attributing but 
not acknowledging the commitment
21
. In this case it seems, prima facie, that since the 
two perspectives are different time-slices of the same individual, they necessarily matter 
for the one keeping score (namely, the present time-slice). This would seem to make 
room for what my argument required, namely, for other’s perspective to matter for the 
individual’s scorekeeping.  
 But this strategy just defers the problem without solving it. The point is for a 
subject to be capable of distinguishing between being-correct to say p and being-
committed to p. Describing an individual as being capable of that presupposes her being 
able to distinguish them as two different perspectives on the same thing. The mere fact 
that it is the same individual as psycho-biological unit does not provide for this relation 
between the two perspectives since change may occur without acknowledging that the 
content is the same. Someone who were not sensitive to cognitive friction could not 
even apply the distinction to herself.  
Hence, as I argued before, the theory lacks the resources to account for the 
individuals being sensitive to each other’s conceptions of right and wrong, even as 
applicable to themselves. The individual will conceive of herself as “the ultimate judge” 
                                                 
21
 So Brandom (2010: 299): “if creatures can take up the different perspective to time slices of 
themselves, then the relation among those time-slices is social in my sense. For I am only claiming that 
intentionality must be social in the sense that it must admit of the distinction of perspectives between the 
attitude of attributing commitment (or other normative status) and the attitude of acknowledging it”. 
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and this means that the notions of authority and responsibility would lose their import 
on the practice.  
Thus, for the practice to be normative it is essential for the participants to have 
second-personal interactions; acknowledging the friction of other individual’s assertions 
by changing their commitments when they are challenged. This is the ground for the 
possibility of them having justifications and reasons that could be publicly inherited and 
also individually held.  If this kind of interaction was not the essential dynamics of the 
practice, what they will be doing would not be characterizable in terms of the notions of 
authority and responsibility that according to Brandom articulate the very structure of a 
social normative linguistic practice. 
The moral of this section is that the commitments of each individual cannot be 
made sense of independently of the agreement with others as to whether they are 
justified or not. This means that the stances of the individuals in a mutual I-Thou 
exchange cannot be thought of as interpretative, scorekeeping stances, where what the 
other is committed to is independent of the justification the other individuals have for 
what they take her to be committed to. Participants need to reach agreement on the role 
of the claims they exchange - whether they see them holding incompatible, entitlement 
or commitment relations -  in a manner in which they assign largely the same inferential 
significance to them. Otherwise, individuals would be left isolated to their own 
individual viewpoints and all cognitive friction would be lost. 
An essential shift in the way the dynamics of rational exchange is understood 
seems to be needed if we are going to make sense of socially articulated practices that 
could count as BLP, a theoretical model in which meaning can come to be shared and 
the same norms govern the way in which individuals make sense of their own 
commitments.  To anticipate, what seems to be needed is a way of understanding the 
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dynamics of BLP where participants mutually recognize their assessments of the claims 
in their exchanges. Along these lines, an alternative characterization of BLP will be 
given in the next section. 
  
3. The Dynamics of Second-personal Interaction. 
 
Overcoming the interpretational picture just discussed involves accounting for 
the responsiveness of each individual to the assessments of others in a more substantial 
way than what is involved in the scorekeeping picture of interaction. 
 According to the conclusion of the previous section, the notion of interpreter as a 
scorekeeper appears to be derivative of a more basic and distinct conception of what one 
needs to be doing in order to be involved in a normative linguistic practice. So the 
question is then what someone needs to be doing in order to be a participant of a 
normative linguistic practice.   
 In the previous section I argued that challenges of others need to matter for the 
individual conception of her own commitments. This implied that the individual needs 
to withdraw claims that are challenged.  Is it sufficient for someone to do that in order 
to count as participant of a socially structured linguistic practice? In this section, I will 
argue in favor of a second sort of activity also necessary for someone to be such a 
participant.  By the end of the section a non-interpretational picture of what 
participation in BLP requires in terms of second-personal interaction will be offered. 
Assuming a third-personal interpretative stance will prove to be dependent on first 
being able to engage in a second-personal interaction with others.
22
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 At this point, the readers may be thinking that Davidson’s triangulation might be the right tool to 
provide sufficient conditions for participants in BLP, especially his later notion of a second person 
(Davidson 1992). Nevertheless, one might doubt this as Davidson never abandons the interpretational 
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In MIE’s picture, the minimum conditions sufficient on the part of the 
participants in a linguistic practice for them to count as interpreters are that they keep 
score of their commitments and entitlements. This means that each participant must 
have two boxes: one for his commitments and at least one for other person’s 
commitments and entitlements. Granted that if we think of this activity as the basis of 
the exchange there are not any meanings in place for them to be dealing with, the key 
question to be asked is what makes it possible for someone to keep score on others and 
on himself. The conclusion of the previous section is that further characterizations that 
account for the sensitivity to correction are needed. 
In the framework of MIE, what is necessary and sufficient for an interpreter to 
be entitled to attribute a commitment is just that the interpreted one does something that 
makes it appropriate for the interpreter to attribute the commitment. This is what counts 
as undertaking a commitment, which is different from acknowledging a commitment. 
The latter notion implies not only undertaking the commitment but accepting the 
commitment that one had undertaken by overtly doing something that in the eyes of the 
scorekeeper counts as committing herself in that way. Is the notion of acknowledgment 
just described sufficient to account for the subject to be engaged in second-personal sort 
of interaction with another person of the kind described in the previous section where 
each other’s assessments necessarily matter for the individual’s point of view? 
  Brandom presents an example that can be taken as paradigmatic of how he 
understands acknowledging a commitment. 
The example is inspired by an Eighteenth-Century British practice.  According 
to this practice, taking “the Queen’s shilling” from a recruiting officer counted as 
committing the recipient to military service.  This practice actually functioned by 
                                                                                                                                               
stance characteristic of radical interpretation even when he refers to it as “second person”.  See also n. 17 
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making people in taverns take the Queen’s shilling from these officers without them 
realizing the commitment they were by that act undertaking.  As Brandom analyses the 
case, the mere taking the shilling counts as an acknowledgment of the commitment 
undertaken. The conclusion is that the significance of the acknowledgment of 
commitment must be understood in terms of the practical attitudes of the participants in 
the eyes of those attributing it and not by some special act of recognition of the 
commitment attributed on the part attributee.    
But, is making it appropriate for others to attribute a commitment sufficient to 
count as a participant of the practice (undertake commitments, as we may say)? The 
obvious answer is no. The reason why this is not sufficient is that one has to be 
attributing commitments also. Here lies the crucial difference between other animals, 
for example, and humans. And more in general between communities to which 
commitments can be attributed (that is: the doings of their members can count for others 
as undertakings of commitments) and communities whose members can attribute 
commitments. This shows that the Queen’s shilling example cannot be generalized.
23
 
There must be something else in place in order to make sense of which doings are 
necessary in order to be a language user other than it just being appropriate for us to 
attribute a commitment to them, in the absence of any recognition of an attribution. 
Moreover, there is an important closely related issue pointed out by Pippin (2006), 
                                                                                                                                               
above. 
23
 As a reviewer remarked, the specific recruitment practice of the Queen’s shilling depends on a wider 
up-and-running practice- the drunkard’s commitment is dependent on him previously being a loyal 
servant to the Queen- and thus depends on the dynamics of acknowledgment and attribution of 
commitments that make such practice possible. This may speak against the possibility of generalizing the 
shilling case to characterize acknowledgement. But the notion of acknowledgment Brandom deploys to 
understand the background practice is the same: making for others appropriate to attribute a commitment, 
and hence the problem lies at the heart of Brandom’s account. For an analysis of the shilling example 
along the same lines, see Pippin (2006): 395-6. 
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namely, that because of the way Brandom characterizes acknowledgement- as making it 
appropriate by doing something to be attributed a commitment-  he cannot make sense 
of the idea of commitments being freely undertaken by the subjects, having the 
character of self-imposed norms, something that Brandom himself wants to account for, 
especially when emphasizing his Kantian lineage (See MIE: ch.1, and TMD: 219) 
What is exactly the difference in the most basic case between participants of 
linguistic practices and beings to which commitments are only attributed? The 
difference, I want to suggest, is that the interpreter has to recognize commitments, that 
is, it is not only necessary to undertake commitments but also to acknowledge some of 
them oneself in a different sense than just making it appropriate for others to attribute 
them to us. That is what we have been calling recognition of commitments.
24
 Promises 
and marriages are typical examples of this kind of recognition. In such acts it is 
essential for their felicity that those involved know and acknowledge their commitment 
to fulfilling the promises thereby undertaken. If e.g. the promisee were only interpreting 
that a promise is being made to her, then no commitment would hold for the other part 
no matter how misleading were her acts. 
We can agree with Brandom that the notion of acknowledgement is a normative 
one. By acknowledging something -p - we respond to that as something that is 
appropriate for us to be attributed commitment to. It is thus a notion that needs to be 
modeled taking into account the ways in which our action is assessed as correct or 
incorrect.  But, as it was argued before, if we take into account only the individual’s 
doings - seen in the eyes of others but insolated from to any influence of those 
assessments in how the individual keeps her score on herself- we cannot make sense of 
                                                 
24
 As it will be apparent, there is a strong tie between recognition and freedom. Only free subjects can be 
part of such a recognitional practice, since each participant must be in a position to endorse the attribution 
(or reject it). I will come back to this at the end of this section. 
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the individuals becoming sensitive to normativity. The notion of being correct collapses 
in this view since it is unintelligible that a proper criterion of correction is in place. In 
the basic case this counts as lacking the criteria for sameness of commitment as a 
normative notion to be applied to herself and others.  If , in a social model of 
normativity,  acknowledgement is a notion that needs to be modeled taking into account 
the ways in which our action is assessed as correct or incorrect and these have to impact 
the conception the individual has of what she is doing, acknowledging a commitment 
should not be thought of as “ making appropriate for others to attribute a commitment”. 
Rather it is to be understood as a way of (correctly or incorrectly) recognizing an 
assessment of correction by others (i.e. recognizing a commitment that is attributed to 
us).  It appears, thus, as the way in which we are sensitive to those assessments
25
.  
It is in the framework of making sense of this sensitivity where the interaction of 
a second-personal sort (as opposed to a third-personal one) comes into view. Becoming 
an interpreter has to be done in the first instance by acknowledging, in the sense of 
recognizing, the assessments of someone else (in the basic case it can be the recognition 
of another person’s reactions towards our doings).  
The order of explanation cannot account for a third personal way of assessing 
others commitments without making sense of this notion in a manner that necessarily 
matters for the individual- i.e. as part of a second personal sort of exchange. The 
individual has to recognize the assessments of others in the first place and only thereby 
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 As will be shown, at least in some cases acknowledgment is of commitments attributed (by someone 
else), i.e. recognizing them by changing your score. This is particularly important to be a participant of 
the practice, although it is not a general constraint on acknowledgments nor on the things we are 
committed to. We can be committed to things we do not know we are (ignorance) or be mistaken about 
our commitments (error). Moreover, the content of the claim acknowledged might, and usually will, 
outrun our grasping of it. The point is rather that the individuals need to recognize the appropriateness of 
the attribution – and all what follows from it.  
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would it be possible for her to take the stance of an external interpreter.  This 
recognizing of the assessment is in the first instance the recognition of the commitment 
attributed to her by someone else; it is the act of recognition by which the attributee 
includes the commitment attributed in her own box. This is one of the sides of what 
counts as having a second-personal sort of interaction with someone else. Nevertheless, 
this cannot be the whole story since it could still be the case that one participant could 
not recognize the criticisms that other participants may address to her (the very trait that 
in the previous section showed itself as necessary to be in place in any linguistic 
practice). Lacking this trait, she would not be in the position to take herself to be wrong, 
and hence she would not be sensitive to assessments of correction, and to normativity at 
all.  
So, in order to make sense of the notion of a participant of a normative linguistic 
practice there are two attitudes that must be in place. 
The first one is for the individual to recognize the commitment attributed to her 
by others. We can think of this recognition as one side of the constitution of the 
authority that a practitioner must inherit from the reactions of another person regarding 
her individual doings. But, second, the sensitivity to correction must at the same time 
account for the possibility of being wrong, for the possibility to be corrected by others. 
The special way in which this recognition is effective is again by recognizing the other 
person’s claim, but this time as a challenge. This is the other side of the coin and 
different in character from the recognizing-acknowledging of an attributed commitment 
just described.   
So, if, on the one hand, the recognition by acknowledging commitments is 
needed in order to make sense of one’s taking oneself to be committed, on the other 
hand, what is needed in order to make sense of one’s being entitled to that commitment, 
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i.e. of the possibility of being wrong, is the recognition of another person’s challenges 
by acknowledging her criticisms as determining what one is not entitled to when one is 
committed to something. This is what has been argued for as necessary in the previous 
section. 
In sum, a second-personal sort of interaction involves the presence of two 
dimensions of social exchange: on the one hand, there must be an acknowledging of the 
other person’s attributions of commitments in the loaded sense of recognizing such 
attribution and not merely doing so in ‘the eyes of the interpreter’ (one side of the 
recognition of the authority of the attributor); on the other, the sensitivity to correction 
implies one recognizing the incompatibilities attributed - the challenges made by others, 
i.e.  the recognition of other person’s criticism by changing one’s own box, by 
withdrawing commitments previously held (this is the side of authority that is strictly 
linked with responsibility). If this second activity were not in place, we would lose the 
possibility of correcting each other and hence the possibility of self-correcting 
ourselves.  
This second-personal interaction can be thought of as describing the proper 
dynamics of the mutual recognition of authority and responsibility. It is the activity that 
takes place when two interlocutors acknowledge each other’s claims by changing their 
commitments, either by undertaking a commitment attributed or by withdrawing a 
commitment previously held. And this activity is the one needed to make sense of a 
normative linguistic practice in the first place. 
This speaks against Brandom’s claim that there is no significant difference 
between the point of view from within the practice and an external stance towards it. 
The second-personal dynamics I have described can only make sense within a practice 
and is not reducible to an external stance on it. It properly exhibits the form of a 
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conversation, where each person’s contribution matters for the individuals involved, and 
not of interpretation, where individuals can remain ignorant about each other’s 
assessments.  
To think of the BLP as a form of conversation not equivalent to two interpreters 
keeping score of each other “from the outside” (i.e. the collapse of the internal and 
external perspectives) brings to the fore another important structural difference between 
the second personal understanding of the fine structure of rationality and an 
interpretational understanding of it. 
As said before one key aspect of the notion of recognition as opposed to the idea 
of “making appropriate to others to attribute commitments”, is that recognition speaks 
to freedom, Pippin’s worry mentioned above. It speaks to it because to recognize a 
commitment is to endorse it. Something that an individual might freely decide not to do.   
Importantly if the individual rejects the attribution then the stage of shared norms is not 
reached. There is conflict, not a shared norm in place. For there to a be a shared norm 
there has to be agreement: both individuals, the attributer and the attributee, need to 
endorse the commitment and share its interpretation. This is to think of content in terms 
of one box and not two. The content of p is to be assessed in the light of all the 
individual doings in a coherent manner. This is compatible with there being material 
disagreements in practice as to what the meaning of a claim is but those are to be seen 
as in need of being resolved.  Because these are to be thought as belonging to just one 
shared semantic interpretation there is cognitive friction that is in need of being resolved 
by reaching agreement. Agreement is then a normative matter, a regulative principle of 
the practice, that gives unity to the structure of semantic contents. This is in striking 
contrast with the idea that interpretations and incompatibilities lie at the heart of BLP, 
for a principle of agreement in conversation outruns individual interpretations 
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exercising normative pressure towards common understanding and against potential 
conflict and incompatibilities. 
 
4. Concluding remarks 
 
The aim of this paper was to show that Brandom’s account of normative 
linguistic practices is problematic and needs to be reshaped in terms of a second-
personal sort of interaction. If these arguments are sound, then it is simply not true that 
the fundamental form of our engagement with others is interpretational. Rather, second 
personal interaction implies a form of sharing reasons that is first-personally accessible 
for each of those involved in a way that is irreducibly inaccessible to an interpretational 
external stance from where we are only observable or interpretable as doing something 
but not experiencing it together. Brandom talks about the fundamental collapse between 
the internal perspective and the external one. Such a collapse is an illusion. The internal, 
second-personal point of view shapes our sense of authority and responsibility as 
rational beings in a way that cannot be made intelligible from a merely external 
perspective. The external, observational stance is of a fundamental distinct type as 
compared to an internal, participant or second-person perspective. The later implies that 
a fundamental agreement is built upon the actual exchanges and mutual responsiveness 
of the practitioners. We can observe communities and attribute entitlements and 
commitments to them; perhaps we can do this with other animals or computers, but 
what is at stake in the case of the internal, participatory interaction, is the acquiring and 
occupying of a place in a shared space that is shaped by our responsiveness to each 
other. 
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